Jonathan David Schwartz

7124251, Oct 17, 2006

Jun 24, 2002

10/178291

Jason Clark - Bothell WA, US
Scott A. Field - Redmond WA, US
Jonathan David Schwartz - Redmond WA, US
Clifford P. Van Dyke - Bellevue WA, US

Microsoft Corporation - Redmond WA

G06F 12/00

711132, 711100, 711154, 711170, 717130, 717133

A stack allocation system and method is described. In one implementation, an attempt is made to allocate N bytes of data to a stack having a fixed depth. A probe size for the stack is determined. Verification is then made to ascertain whether the probe size and the N bytes of data exceed the fixed depth of the stack, prior to allocating the N bytes of data to the stack. In another implementation, the N bytes of data are allocated to a heap; if the probe size and the N bytes of data exceed the fixed depth of the stack.

7426029, Sep 16, 2008

Aug 31, 2005

11/217070

Charles A Mauzy - Sammamish WA, US
Michael D Stokes - Eagle ID, US
Gary K. Starkweather - Bellevue WA, US
Jonathan R. Schwartz - Bellevue WA, US

Microsoft Corporation - Redmond WA

G01J 3/28

356328, 356326, 356425, 356402

Color measurement using compact devices is described herein. A color measurement device can include a diffraction grating that receives light reflected from a surface whose color is being measured. The diffraction grating is responsive to a control signal to split selected components from the reflected light and to admit the components in sequence to a sensor. The components can correspond to a selected wavelength or frequency of the reflected light. The sensor measures the energy or power level of each of the admitted components. The device can support determining a spectral representation of the color of the surface by generating output signals representing the various energy or power levels of each component of the light reflected from the surface.

7490352, Feb 10, 2009

Apr 7, 2005

11/100770

Michael Kramer - Yonkers NY, US
Kenneth D. Ray - Seattle WA, US
Paul England - Bellevue WA, US
Scott A. Field - Redmond WA, US
Jonathan D. Schwartz - Kirkland WA, US

Microsoft Corporation - Redmond WA

G06F 21/22
G06F 21/00
G06F 12/14

726 22, 726 23, 726 24, 726 25, 713188, 713189, 713190, 717127, 717130, 717131

Systems and methods for validating integrity of an executable file are described. In one aspect, the systems and methods determine that an executable file is being introduced into a path of execution. The executable file is then automatically evaluated in view of multiple malware checks to detect if the executable file represents a type of malware. The multiple malware checks are integrated into an operating system trust verification process along the path of execution.

7506380, Mar 17, 2009

Jan 14, 2005

11/035715

Jamie Hunter - Bothell WA, US
Paul England - Bellevue WA, US
Russell Humphries - Redmond WA, US
Stefan Thom - Snohomish WA, US
Kenneth D. Ray - Seattle WA, US
Jonathan Schwartz - Kirkland WA, US

Microsoft Corporation - Redmond WA

G06F 21/02
G06F 11/30
G06F 9/00
H04L 9/00
H04K 1/00

726 26, 726 16, 713 1, 713189

Systems and methods are provided for maintaining and updating a secure boot process on a computer with a trusted platform module (TPM). A boot process may be maintained by inspecting a log of TPM activity, determining data that prevented a secret to unseal, and returning the data to an original state. In situations where this type of recovery is not workable, techniques for authenticating a user may be used, allowing the authenticated user to bypass the security features of the boot process and reseal the boot secrets to platform configuration register (PCR) values that may have changed. Finally, a secure boot process may be upgraded by migrating TPM sealed secrets to a temporary storage location, updating one or more aspects of a secure boot process, and resealing the secrets to the resulting new platform configuration. Other advantages and features of the invention are described below.

7565553, Jul 21, 2009

Jan 14, 2005

11/036415

Jamie Hunter - Bothell WA, US
Paul England - Bellevue WA, US
Russell Humphries - Redmond WA, US
Stefan Thom - Snohomish WA, US
Kenneth D. Ray - Seattle WA, US
Jonathan Schwartz - Kirkland WA, US

Microsoft Corporation - Redmond WA

G06F 12/14

713192, 726 34

Systems and methods for controlling access to data on a computer with a secure boot process can provide a highly efficient mechanism for preventing future access to encrypted digital resources. This may be advantageous in a range of scenarios, for example where a computer is sold and assurance is desired that no stray private data remains on the hard disk. Data resources, for example all data associated with one or more particular hard disk partitions, may be encrypted. The decryption key may be available through a secure boot process. By erasing, altering, or otherwise disabling a secret, such as a decryption key or a process that obtains a decryption key, the data formerly accessible using such secret becomes inaccessible.

7577848, Aug 18, 2009

Jan 18, 2005

11/037566

Jonathan D. Schwartz - Kirkland WA, US
Yu Lin Sie - Bellevue WA, US
Philip Joseph Hallin - Port Townsend WA, US

Microsoft Corporation - Redmond WA

G06F 11/30

713187, 713165, 713168, 713176, 713188, 726 24, 711216, 717126, 717168, 717169, 717172, 717173, 717174, 717175, 717177, 717178

Systems and methods for validating integrity of an executable file are described. In one aspect, multiple partial image hashes are generated, the combination of which represent a digest of an entire executable file. Subsequent to loading the executable file on a computing device, a request to page a portion of the executable file into memory for execution is intercepted. Responsive to intercepting the request, and prior to paging the portion into memory for execution, a validation hash of the portion is computed. The validation hash is compared to a partial hash of the multiple partial image hashes to determine code integrity of the portion. The partial hash represents a same code segment as the portion.

7636851, Dec 22, 2009

Jun 30, 2005

11/171744

Jeffrey B. Hamblin - Issaquah WA, US
Jonathan Schwartz - Kirkland WA, US
Kedarnath A. Dubhashi - Redmond WA, US
Klaus U. Schutz - Kirkland WA, US
Peter T. Brundrett - Seattle WA, US
Richard B. Ward - Redmond WA, US
Thomas C. Jones - Sammamish WA, US

Microsoft Corporation - Redmond WA

G06F 21/00

713182, 713172, 713185, 709225, 709229, 726 2, 726 4, 726 9, 726 10

An operating system for a computing device has a first session for a user that includes a first base process that has a first privileges token attached thereto. The first privileges token includes substantially a full set of privileges of the user on the operating system. The operating system also has a second session for the user that includes a second base process that has a second privileges token attached thereto. The second privileges token is derived from the first privileges token and includes only a minimum set of privileges of the user on the operating system. Thus, the second, limited token does not have all privileges associated with the first, full token but instead has a limited set of privileges and not extra privileges that could be employed to take actions that would be harmful, deceptive, or malicious.

7725703, May 25, 2010

Jan 7, 2005

11/031161

Jamie Hunter - Bothell WA, US
Paul England - Bellevue WA, US
Russell Humphries - Redmond WA, US
Stefan Thom - Snohomish WA, US
Kenneth D Ray - Seattle WA, US
Jonathan Schwartz - Kirkland WA, US

Microsoft Corporation - Redmond WA

G06F 21/02
G06F 21/22

713 2, 713100, 713170, 713181, 713193, 726 29, 726 34, 380259

In a computer with a trusted platform module (TPM), an expected hash value of a boot component may be placed into a platform configuration register (PCR), which allows a TPM to unseal a secret. The secret may then be used to decrypt the boot component. The hash of the decrypted boot component may then be calculated and the result can be placed in a PCR. The PCRs may then be compared. If they do not, access to the an important secret for system operation can be revoked. Also, a first secret may be accessible only when a first plurality of PCR values are extant, while a second secret is accessible only after one or more of the first plurality of PCR values has been replaced with a new value, thereby necessarily revoking further access to the first secret in order to grant access to the second secret.